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“What am I thinking when I think what exists?”2 
 
Once something is said of something else, this “what it is that exists” or X of 
which what is said is said, is augmented, however minimally, by its 
expression. Due to the resulting progressive series, asking after what it is of 
which what is said is said, cannot be answered by withdrawing what is said of 
it, by the ungeschenmachen of predication, but only by further augmentation, 
even if this consists in adding predicates that negate their predecessors. On 
the one hand, it may be said that here, yet again, philosophy finds the world 
well lost, for what is as it is remains unrecoverable once subject to 
augmentation. Yet what would this unaugmented X be? It cannot be said to 
enjoy any character whatever, since if it did, it would be self-evident that 
insufficient predicates had been pared away from it. Therefore, the 
unaugmented is just that: that after which nothing, the denatured 
inconsequential. Moreover, since nothing is after the inconsequential, neither 
can it be after anything, since if it were, it would not be the object of our 
inquiry but rather an elimination candidate obstructing it. If this is the world 
unadorned, it is a world without consequents, a nature without history or 
beginning. Such a world is not ‘lost,’ since if ‘world’ is defined as “all that 
is” or “the totality of facts” it is not yet a ‘world’ because there is no ‘all’ nor 
‘totality’ nor ‘fact,’ since each would be ex hypothesi consequent upon that 
which has no consequents. Subject to this deflationary absolute, it is at most 
an extensionless point. Yet a point entails its environment, however 
undetermined, save as not-that-point, an environment the inconsequentialist is 
sworn to eliminate. The elimination is possible only consequently upon that 
environment’s obtaining, which it does just when there is a point. 
Accordingly, the inconsequentialist’s eliminata are consequents, and their 
negation consequent again upon them. 
                                                 
1 A first version of this paper was presented at the First Annual Meeting of the North American 
Schelling Society (NASS), Seattle University, August 30-September 1, 2012. I am deeply 
indebted to Jason Wirth and Sean McGrath for organizing that excellent event, and to the 
glacial ascent that (still) follows it. 
2 F.W.J. Schelling, Exhibition of the Process of Nature, SW I/10, 303-390, here 303; trans. I.H. 
Grant, forthcoming in On the World Soul and Other Naturephilosophical Writings (Albany: 
SUNY). 
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 Since therefore deflation unavoidably inflates on that side of the 
world’s axis that is “not-world,” inflation entails that a world is augmented 
just if the line dividing the unadorned world from its augmentations is itself 
of a worldly kind. Strikingly, this applies to what is said of something else 
and what is said not to be of something else: since the world is not of one 
kind prior to its consequents but only in consequence of them, the kind to 
which the world belongs is forged by its corona, not determined by its core. 
The world is thus the reiterated operation of augmentation regardless of what 
the augmentation is; it is less ‘spurious infinite’ than lacking the conditions 
for completeness, or essential limitation. But since each reduction is 
consequent upon a “not-X” that is to be stripped from the world, it is also the 
operation of augmentation augmented by a negation of that augmentation that 
is, accordingly, consequent upon it. The termini of neither series are 
exhibitable. 
The foregoing is a partial exhibition of what is exhibited in 
Schellling’s Exhibition of the Process of Nature (DATE), in the sense that it 
sets out a rough homology of a process exhibited in that work. In what sense, 
however, could it, or some more elaborate version of it, be affirmed to be the 
titular ‘process of nature’? In one sense, given the irreducible surd 
consequent upon the above formulation, it is of nature just when it is not 
sufficiently grounded in it. In consequence, this renders the affirmation 
insecure. In another, it is ‘of nature’ in the sense that its exhibition counts 
amongst world-augmentors. Yet the entailed locality of the process thus 
exhibited as in nature cannot therefore deliver on the title’s promise—
namely, to exhibit the—not ‘a’—process of nature or, as the Exhibition calls 
it, the uni-versio. Yet what is being thought when there is thinking of nature? 
How does this thinking differ from an exhibition that is ‘of’ nature in both the 
senses described? And if it does so differ, to what extent is the process 
merely a nominal belonging? By contrast, if it does not so differ, to what 
extent is it therefore that mode of operation by which nature is actualized in 
its exhibition? Answering these questions, and noting the irreducible 
positionality or locality of the problem of nature’s self-augmentation by 
rational exhibition of its process, will take us some way to locating the 
position of Naturphilosophie in Schelling’s late philosophy.  
Yet the question of whether nature is exhibited, modelled, in an 
exhibition is not a narrow concern for Schelling scholarship. If a modelling or 
exhibition of nature is not itself, qua model, issuant from the nature it is of, 
then epistemology does not merely supplant ontology as first philosophy, but 
yields therefore a specious naturalism that, insofar as it seeks only 
epistemological guidance, has no concern with nature beyond what can be 
reduced to what is I of it by the deliverances of the natural sciences. Here, 
there are two possibilities. First, the exhibition is of nature because nature, 
according to epistemic primacy, is not until so exhibited. In this case, there is 
no egress problem from knowledge of nature to nature as such because nature 
as such is nature as presented. Second, the modelling is not of nature since it 
is just a model that, as such, eliminates nature as either object or locus 
(subject, in this sense) of that model. To cast this as an instance of the 
epistemic problem of realism and antirealism regarding theorizations of 
nature is not only oversimplified, it ignores the upheaval that presents what 
3 
 
ontology there can be as the fruit of whatever can be justified 
epistemologically. The first option renders Schelling’s “exhibition” 
equivalent to Kant’s “representation,” such that nature is nothing other than 
“the whole of all appearances,” 3 so that nature is not an appearance, but 
rather the total series of epistemically ‘cooked’ issuances. While nature’s 
being and appearing are the same on this account, the asymmetry between the 
whole and the series constituting it prevents the sameness from exhibition, 
such that the idea will always exceed the actuality in extension, while 
remaining a thin and one-sidedly ‘thoughtish’ element of that actuality itself. 
The second option oscillates inconsistently between conceiving construction 
as “exhibition in pure intuition”4 and, in consequence, the relegation of what 
is not so exhibited to a pure externality that, whether consequently disavowed 
or not, remains. If Schelling’s exhibition of natural process, of the uni-versio, 
is to offer a corrective for this, it must therefore encompass both mono-phasic 
construction and externality without falling victim to the reduction of 
ontology to the logic of knowing. 
Whatever it is that nature is includes those sciences (epistemology, 
physics, etc.) amongst its deliverances, and is only therefore reducible to their 
content on pain of the segregation of what is not their content into some 
extra-natural domain. What such naturalism offers are therefore two forms of 
philosophical auto-amputation. Due to certain epistemic prejudices—that 
givenness is neither foundational nor consistent, the demonstration that being 
is not a real predicate—neither pre-rational access nor super-rational egress 
remain plausible, leaving reference to nature or grounding in it a problem. 
Assuming, then, neither an in nor an out of reason, to ask the question, as 
Schelling does, “How do we reach being outside the idea?”5 is either naïve or 
irresponsible, since it rejects sound philosophical progress. Yet if that 
question is not asked, it can only be because for responsibly progressive 
philosophy, there neither is nor can be anything outside reason. 
 
First Universio: Extainment and the Weltgesetz 
 
What then is exhibited in the Exhibition of the Process of Nature? If we take 
that work to exemplify Schelling’s later Naturphilosophie, the latter consists, 
amongst other things, in an argument as to why nature does not satisfy all 
demands for grounding, since although once it exists, nature becomes the 
“ground of all consequent becomings”6 and “the nature that permeates 
everything,”7 nevertheless “all becoming in nature is the actualization of 
                                                 
3 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, in Immanuel Kant. Theoretical 
Philosophy after 1781, trans. Michael Friedman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 183; Kants Werke, ed. Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Ak), 29 
vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902). Here Ak 4: 467. 
4 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929) 
A711/B739. 
5 SW I/10, 306. 
6 SW I/10, 324. 
7 SW II/3, 6; trans. Bruce Matthews, Grounding of Positive Philosophy. The Berlin Lectures 
(hereafter Grounding) (Albany: SUNY, 2007), 92. 
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original being and what can not be.”8 The conjunction is important, in that it 
instantiates that model of distributive ontological justice
9
 Schelling states in 
the Exhibition and will later call the Weltgesetz.
10
 That law states that the 
environment of any existent give “full scope to all possibilities, without 
excluding a single one,”11 amongst which possibilities not-being is 
ineliminably included.
12
 Therefore, where grounds occur, they are environed, 
inter alia, by inexistence. Yet what has this to do with the “process of 
nature”? How does mere logic become ontology, how is the “leap into 
being”13 accomplished? Is the Exhibition itself an instance of the operation of 
the natural process, or is it only about that process? Since the Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, the Naturphilosophie repeatedly and variously argues 
that thought is, if not identical to, then at least environed in a nature of which 
it is part. The Dar-, the locality in Darstellung suggests that the Exhibition is 
contributory to reconceiving this project in a manner that has consequences 
not only for the “point” at which “Naturphilosophie is once again taken up in 
the higher, positive system,”14 but for those points at which nature is 
                                                 
8 SW I/10, 387. See also Schelling’s comments, at SW I/10, 385n, concerning the “autonomy 
[Selbständigkeit]” of the “self-moving principle” in nature. This autonomy is premised, he 
argues at SW I/10, 348, on the not-being of what is autonomous. 
9 Schelling makes a similar claim concerning the “equally valid claim of all systems” in “On 
the Nature of Philosophy as Science” (SW I/9, 211). The Schellingian concept of justice 
implicit in the Weltgesetz is cosmological, as is the Platonic, having to do with nature rather 
than with contract or convention. At Republic 443b-d, Socrates defines dikaiosyne as “a 
potency [dunamin] which provides . . . beautiful order [kosmesanta]” in men and cities. Such 
order is “cosmological” both in the sense of its beauty and “in accordance with nature [kata 
physin]” (Republic 444d), which phrase always accompanies Plato’s discussion of powers. 
Moreover, since order is instantiated in many and results in one, bringing unity from the 
“many-headed monster” (Phaedrus 230a), it consists not only in what Gadamer calls “self-
accord” (Dialogue and Dialectic, trans. P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1980, 88). Owing to the “vast and hazardous” (Parmenides 137a) or “difficult waters” 
(Republic 441c) following which order is to be imposed, exactly as Schelling pursues the 
emergence of order from the “surging, billowing sea” of Platonic matter in the Freiheitschrift 
(SW I/7, 360), order is always order in another. Platonic justice is additionally pertinent 
owing, as Bernard Bosanquet points out, to the Platonic law of non-contradiction (A 
Companion to Plato’s Republic [London: Rivington’s, 1925], 158), which rather than 
eliminating one of two contrary possibilities from the same subject, states that “opposition of 
effects is not to be confused with self-modification of an effect.” Schelling, indeed, makes a 
compatible claim in the Ages of the World: “The correctly understood principle of 
contradiction actually says as much as that the same as the same could not be something and 
also the opposite of that something. But the principle of contradiction does not disallow that 
the same, which is A, can be another that is not-A.” (SW I/8: 214, trans. J.M. Wirth [Albany: 
SUNY, 2000]), 8. Like Schelling’s account of intransitive possibilities or can-being, this does 
not make emergent order eliminative of antecedent disorder but distributes the former amidst 
irreducible disorder. 
10 In the Darstellung der rein-rationalen Philosophie (SW II/1, 492). 
11 SW I/10, 311. 
12 SW I/10, 303: “Now this subject, as capacity, considered as a potency of Being, can 
certainly be thought as raising itself from its sheer, pure subjectivity or potentiality (in 
transition ad actum), so as to be the existent for itself. But in this way the idea of the existent 
would be eliminated before it was thought. The Idea of what is, is that the subject of Being is 
precisely subject, intransitive (merely essential) capacity to be: capacity to be, not to be itself 
what exists, but to be what is able to be.” 
13 SW II/3, 102; Grounding, 160. 
14 F.W.J. Schelling, Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie (hereafter, Grundlegung), ed. 
Horst Fuhrmanns (Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1972), 365. 
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conceived according to universality. As Schelling defines it in the Exhibition, 
something is ‘universal’ not when it is maximally ubiquitous but when it is 
topologically complex and of one kind. Something is universal, that is, when 
its exhibition is of a piece with what is exhibited. The universal is therefore a 
version of the Empedoclean dictum that “like is known by like” or “like is 
produced by like,” which Schelling cites repeatedly between 1802 and 
1809.
15
 As is familiar from the Freiheitschrift’s lessons in the 
“misunderstanding of the law of identity,”16 the first “like” is not the second; 
rather the one is the knowing or the producing of the other. Therefore the two 
likes fold around the action, such that the latter distends from their iteration. 
Hence the topological idea of the uni-versio of the subject of existence and 
existence entails no transition.
17
 The Exhibition thereafter consists in making 
the motions of the universio not merely apparent, but palpable, provoking 
motions in the conceptual space consequent upon thinking what exists. This 
sculptural union of sense and reason in the concept makes apparent the 
formal impoverishment and philosophical inadequacy of conceiving 
thought’s relation to reality as though two reciprocally exclusive planes are 
combined to form a single, laminar structure. The problem is not of a logical 
topography by means of which thought might be located at spatiotemporal 
points (in brains or as unextended acts), because thought does not move 
exclusively in its own space (the transcendental, the space of reasons, etc.), 
but always in another. Under constraint of sufficiency, yet insecure in its 
achievement, reason has therefore to think what is not it. 
To return to its beginning, Schelling’s procedure is the following. I 
begin from what I must think. What am I thinking when I think what exists? 
When I think what exists, I must think the subject of existence itself. Not 
‘the’ or ‘a’ subject that exists, but existence as the subject, in the sense of that 
of which what is said is said. The subject of existence is not itself an existent 
therefore, to achieve which that subject must be “directed away from infinite 
being.”18 As such, it cannot itself ‘exist’ without ceasing to be infinite being 
in the idea, or unlimited capacity-to-be. Nor can it make a transition from 
not-being to being, nor again from potentia ad actum, without entailing its 
elimination as that subject.
19
 The existent or ‘object’ is the consequent of the 
attractor that being is for what infinitely can-be. But not infinite ability to be 
is conjoined with an infinite not-being of that subject, i.e., precisely the 
                                                 
15 See, for example, SW I/4, 269 (Bruno); I/6, 326, 338 (Würzburg System); I/7, 337 
(Freiheitschrift); I/7, 277, 281, 285 (Naturephilosophical Aphorisms); I/7, 481 (Stuttgart 
Lectures). It recurs in the Weltalter drafts and the Erlangen lectures. 
16 SW I/7, 341. 
17 The “Universio” is “the immediate result of the procedure is the inverted One—Unum 
versum, that is ‘universe.’” This ‘one’ is the first in the series –A+A±A, which is a series just 
when its elements are active. Therefore, there is no transition from, e.g., –A+A, rather each 
cedes its position to accommodate the existent (I/10, 310), which position is an inversion with 
respect to the consequent or higher, for which, in this newly vertical series, it serves as matter, 
ground or basis. Hence the Weltgesetz: “The broader this basis, the more it furnishes full scope 
to all possibilities, without excluding a single one” (SW I/10, 311). 
18 SW I/10, 307. 
19 SW I/10, 303: “Being, can certainly be thought as raising itself from its sheer, pure 
subjectivity or potentiality (in transition ad actum), so as to be the existent for itself. But in this 
way the idea of the existent would be eliminated before it was thought. The Idea of what is, is 
that the subject of Being is precisely subject, intransitive (merely essential) capacity to be.” 
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object’s infinitely not being that infinite can-being that the subject is: “The 
infinity of Being in the one makes possible the abyss [Abgrund] of not-being 
in the other.”20 The subject, such as it is—the subject of existence that cannot 
itself exist since if it did, it would precisely thereby cease to be that infinite 
ability to be—“contains” no object, just as the object, which is precisely the 
infinite not-being that it must be if it is opposed to the existent, “contains” in 
turn no subject. Rather, the fault-line of this double non-containment, or 
mutual extainment (Ausschließung),
21
 forges the existent for the first time in 
the idea as what therefore consequently extains the reciprocal extainment of 
clashing infinites. The “convulsions” of Being22 consequent upon this clash 
are precisely consequents of the thinking of existents, catastrophes of 
dimension that ek-sist from what now becomes their ground or “matter,” their 
subordinate or subject. If nature exists, it is in consequence of that nature that 
being becomes a catastrophic environment for it, the catastrophe of its 
ineliminable, environing inexistence. 
 Yet this existent remains the idea of the existent. The advantage of 
the idea is that it contains the totality; its condition, however, is that it does so 
punctually. It is therefore Kant’s idea of reason at the same time as the 
Platonic attractor. As such, the idea of the existent itself exists no more than 
the subject of existence, which is the Anfang and therefore a Potenz of being, 
the “point-attractor” of the existent;23 yet the idea of the existent, rather than 
the subject of being, is itself an additional potency, a “second element of 
being.”24  In consequence of this conjunction, dimensions emerge in the idea 
of the existent: potencies “by their nature” on the cusp of being, which 
thought thinks when there is an existent and there arises an attempt to think it. 
The incipient field for the exhibition of the natural process is therefore 
precisely that thinking insofar as it thinks what is, i.e., thinks consequently 
upon the subject of existence. Rather than confirming its givenness to the 
idea, this thinking entails the thinking of that subject’s inexistence, the 
environment extaining its actuality. 
 In one sense, this territory is familiar from the identity philosophy: 
“being and thinking are the same” is not a statement of identity, but a 
                                                 
20 SW I/10, 304. 
21 “Extainment” (symbolised as ><) is the topological contrary of “containment” (<>). Both 
are conjunctive (that is, one extainment can extain or be extained by another, just as one 
containment can be contained by or contain another) and co-implying, since the containment of 
containment entails that the contained is extained from the container. For further discussion, 
see my “How Nature comes to be Thought: Schelling’s Paradox and the Problem of Location,” 
in Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology 44:1 (2013): 25-44, especially 29-30. See 
also Gilles Châtelet, L’Enchantement du virtuel (Paris: Editions Rue D’Ulm, 2010), 75-81. I 
use it to translate Schelling’s Ausschließung to draw out the function of exclusion in a 
universe. Extainment is thus Weltgesetz-compliant. 
22 SW I/10, 323. Since Schelling’s catastophism owes as much to, e.g., René Thom’s 
mathematical catastrophe theory as to Cuvier’s geology, it is “universal” in the sense specified 
at n8, above. 
23 SW I/10, 303: “The first that I have to think is indisputably the subject of existence which to 
that extent is not yet what exists, but the beginning of being [Anfang zum Seyn], its initial point 
attractor. Considered in itself, this subject of existence, still without being, is pure capacity 
[Können], something about which we cannot say that it is, precisely because it is itself the 
subject of existence. Now this subject, as capacity, considered as a potency of Being. . . .” 
24 SW I/10, 304. 
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potentiation of it. There is no judgment, in other words, that does not alter 
what it judges, no proposition that is not additionally predicated of its subject, 
thus enlarging not its extension but its ipseity or sui generis character. Since 
moreover identity simply is what is insofar as it is, any stipulated existent 
entails a differentiation of identity that, because only identity itself is identity, 
places it outside itself. Moreover, to the extent that differentiation potentiates 
identity, the extensional conception of identity as applying to two instances of 
a single state—as in “for all x, x = x,25 where both the subject’s iterations and 
the difference between subject and predicate are elided
26—is true only to the 
extent that what is essential in the existent is withdrawn and we are left only 
with “the desert of Being.” In another sense, however, what happens in 
thought appears in the later account of this identity to have acquired a 
structure recursive on itself, such that no matter what is thought, the thought 
of what is thought remains in thought. Thought, in other words, extains the 
existent that it thinks “when I think what exists.” But if I think what exists, 
the identity is reaffirmed as the what of the thinking and of the being, but it is 
not and cannot be thought as such, since thinking neither progressively nor 
regressively attains it.
27
 It is not regressively attained because there is no 
point in thinking at which the difference between the thinking introduced into 
being and the being that is not being thought can be eliminated; and not 
progressively since even when the thinking thinks this difference, and thus 
contains it, such “derived absoluteness” remains insuperably derived. That is, 
                                                 
25 The problem is not only that there is in the datum of Russell’s formulation of the law of 
identity (from The Problems of Philosophy [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1912], 40) a 
distinct number of parts (three x’s) and thus undermines the claim of their mutual identity, but 
rather that, in the elision of this fact, identity itself (rather than the identity of x, x) is 
considered satisfied just when the three x’s have a restricted extension (namely, x). At issue is 
(a) whether “for all x, x = x” is an instance of predication rather than definition; and (b) 
whether therefore logical functions are themselves capable of being logical subjects. Schelling 
draws attention to (a) in the Freiheitsschrift, arguing that the propositions “this body is blue” 
and “a body is a body” are both instances of predication (SW I/7, 341-3) and therefore 
instances of the conjunction propositions express. Thus (b) is confirmed, since it can be said of 
a proposition that it instantiates but neither exhausts nor defines occurrent conjunction. 
Moreover, Schelling had already made it clear, in “On the Relation between the Real and the 
Ideal in Nature,” that the copula is not simply the conjunction of terms in a proposition but also 
the “connecting [of] the idea to actuality” (SW I/2, 359), a relation Schelling later cashes out 
by reviving the medieval logical rubric of “reduplication” or “reduplicative positing” (SW 
I/10, 103; trans. A. Bowie, On the History of Modern Philosophy [hereafter, History] 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994], 117). For further discussion of the role of this 
structure in Schelling, see my “Everything is Primal Germ or Nothing Is. Nonlocal Emergence 
and Natural Predication in Schelling’s ‘On the Real and Ideal in Nature,’” forthcoming in 
Symposium (Spring 2015). For an extraordinary discussion of this issue in contemporary 
philosophical logic, see Richard Gaskin, The Unity of the Proposition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008),  223-5 and 314ff, where he pursues this argument in support of what 
he calls “Bradley’s regress,” such that propositions are instances of the relations they 
instantiate, with the quantity of iterations non-finite in principle.  
26 Schelling analyses the “general misunderstanding of the law of identity,” such as we find in 
Russell’s formulation of it, in Philosophical Inquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom and 
the Objects Connected Therewith, trans. James Gutmann (Chicago: Open Court, 1936, 13-14); 
SW I/7, 340-342. 
27 In the antinomies, Kant demonstrates the necessary failure of the regressive series, which 
moves from consequent to ground, to exhibit the totality or the “cosmical concept 
[Weltbegriff],” but discounts the philosophical pertinence of the progressive series moving 
from ground to consequence. Cf. CPR A408-411/B435-8. 
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although any attempted recovery in thought of the ‘what’ it is thinking will 
necessarily issue not in an immediate, but rather in a mediate premise,
28
 
leaving the ‘what’ always subject to an irreducible surd, each attempted 
recovery is accordingly a progressive iteration of that surd-producing 
function.  
Nor does this progressive iteration have an upper limit. Accordingly, 
in thinking identity thought is itself progressively differentiated while 
irreducibly differentiated from the environment within which it occurs. Even 
if the thought should recover this rule—a law of thought—rather than its 
subject (existence as such), the recovered rule thus remains environed, as 
therefore does the exhibition of nature’s process. The surd itself is not some 
void awaiting ideational population, but a surd that exists insofar as it is the 
thought of what is not-thought, both in the sense of a concept of the “not-
thought” and the thinking of what just is not thought. While the former has 
the extension “∞ (–1 ),” because this concept conceives and contains the 
difference between the instances of the concept ‘not-thought’ (∞) and the 
concept itself (1); the latter has the extension “∞ (+1)” because it conceives 
the difference between the concept (1) and what it is not, insofar as the 
concept is included amongst existents (∞). Not only therefore does “∞ (– 1)” 
≠ “∞ (+1),”29 since the right hand side of the equation is the polar opposite of 
the left, but neither are the elements on either side reducible one to another, 
because the concept introduces precisely that asymmetry in being introduced 
by differentiators of identity. In other words, when there is existence, ‘all that 
is’ entails the differentiation of identity. Even if nothing were to exist, 
identity would not obtain, since it depends for its obtaining on the difference 
its formulation or instantiation entails, namely, that its assertion constitutes 
precisely an instance of its differentiation. 
Yet to this extend, the surd becomes the matter for thinking, in that 
matter is not otherwise than as it is thought, especially insofar as thought 
retains the thought that thought precisely extains the matter that it does not 
think, that is not thought, but that nevertheless does the thinking in it.  
 Accordingly, the later Naturphilosophie aggravates the asymmetry 
that was there from the outset in Schelling’s account of nature thinking, or 
Naturphilosophie. The directional difference by means of which either 
Naturphilosophie or Transcendental philosophy were differentiated is now 
acknowledged to take place in the thinking of the reciprocal grounding of 
these two sciences. But this is not to say that grounding must henceforth be 
abandoned for the reason that, since no grounding is achieved that is not 
grounding in thought, therefore there is no grounding. Nor is it to say that the 
grounding that is not the operation of thought does not for that reason occur. 
Rather, since there is a point at which the Naturphilosophie “is once again 
taken up into the higher, positive system,”30 and since the Naturphilosophie  
is the topic of the Exhibition, the question is, Why must it be taken up again? 
If grounding is to be sacrificed, then that operation is no longer thought in the 
                                                 
28 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I 2, 72a8: An “immediate premise is one which has no other 
premise prior to it.” 
29 Nor again does (–1) = (+1), where the units are unlimitedly environed; nor is “∞ = ∞,” since 
the copula is additive, i.e., an instance of the relation it expresses (see note 25, above). 
30 Grundlegung, 365. 
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late philosophy as in the earlier, insofar as in the latter case it was not only 
one of the two “grounding sciences,”31 but also original, albeit an original 
idealism. “Is there,” Schelling stipulates . . .  
 
. . . any means of philosophizing at all other than the idealistic? I 
want above all that this expression acquire greater determinacy than 
it currently has. There is an idealism of nature, and an idealism of the 
I. To me, the former is the original, and the latter the derivative.
32
 
 
Although this distributes two idealisms, rather than an idealism and an 
alternative, priority remains “by nature” insuperable.33 Accordingly, what is 
important in this account is that primary and derivative, proteron and 
hysteron, prius and posterius constitute irreversible series. But if we rush to 
identify the structural homology between this and the equally irreversible 
moments in the construction of the idea that the Exhibition says are the means 
by which thought “reaches Being outside the idea,”34 and claim therefore that 
nature really is nothing but its structures and their interrelations, so that when 
I think what exists, I think only structures; then directionality supersedes the 
moments themselves, and the resultant concepts of nature and of the concept 
are reciprocally impoverished, reduced to the outlines of the desert world of 
those who want that only Being exist. Moreover, the elimination this move 
entails with regard to the difference between the idea and its outside suggests 
these determinations are themselves only “ideal” in the pejorative sense that 
they do not add to being, but merely to seeming. In other words, there only 
seems to be a difference between thinking and being.  
Even at this level, the original-derivative contrastive pair included in 
the structure-generating account in Schelling’s “true concept,” undermines a 
construal of the identity claim extensionally; if, that is, there is even in the 
ideal an irreversible sequential difference between nature and thinking, then 
the elimination of the ideal-spatial difference between thinking and being 
does not suffice to de-differentiate them to the point of identity. The reason 
the elimination fails is precisely because “nature first, thinking second” 
remains true whether the context in which this sequence runs be nature or a 
holodeck.   
That insufficient dedifferentiation has occurred in order to establish 
the identity is because the desired extension is undermined by the both 
infinite and punctual extension of identity itself. In other words, regardless of 
the terms of the identity relation, the ‘is’ in it has no content but is rather an 
operator against which the extension demanded is measured as specific and 
relative difference. Thus, as Schelling argues in the Freiheitsschrift, “X = X” 
has exactly the same function as “this body is blue,” because it is precisely 
not a question of folding the extension around the copula, but rather of how 
                                                 
31 See e.g., System of Transcendental Idealism (hereafter, System), SW I/3: 341, trans. P. Heath 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), 6. 
32 “On the True Concept of Naturphilosophie and the Correct Means of Resolving its 
problems,” SW I/4, 84. 
33 SW I/7: 340: “No kind of combination can transform that which is by nature derived into 
that which is by nature original.” 
34 SW I/10, 306. 
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the copula distributes differences. The point is not that all predication is in 
fact an identity claim, but that the identity claim is an instance of predication. 
Thus S and p are, when there is p, ground and consequent, such that not only 
is p an extension of S, but once there is p, p casts S as the ground upon which 
it is consequent.
35
 The reason, that is, why sequence is the vital differentiator 
is that the difference between being (Seyn) and existent (Seyende), regardless 
of what the latter happens to be, is historical or genetic. Thus, the subject 
consequently antecedent to the predicate is not itself a predicate, but that of 
which the predicate is said, and any predication augments a subject in 
accordance with that predicate. By virtue of being a predicate, it is neither 
immediately a subject nor is it all of the subject of which it is predicated. 
Predication thus instantiates the structure of expression, of exhibition or 
Darstellung, i.e., showing, placing-there or locating in, such that, far from 
being recoverable in the exhibition, what exists does so only as its corona, not 
its core, without being reducible to it. The subject, that is, is not super-large, 
but expands only with its consequents, which it then environs. This means 
that a consequent only is when it is other than that on which it is consequent 
and on which it depends: were the dependent not something independent 
from that on which it is dependent, it would not be consequent at all.  
 
Second Universio: “What thinks in me is what is outside me”36 
 
In this line from the System der Weltalter, Schelling rearticulates the identity 
thesis with which the Naturphilosophie began, in the Ideen zu einer 
Philosophie der Natur, with this famous claim, “Nature should be Mind made 
visible, mind invisible nature.”37 The claim for this “thoroughgoing identity” 
is not simple, not least because, despite the impression of a closing cycle, the 
asymmetry between the two parts of this claim remains evident: neither is 
nature exhausted in visible mind, nor mind in visible nature. 
1) Nature “should be” mind made visible—and therefore is not. The 
same applies to mind and invisible nature. 
2) The sense that mind might or might not be visible, intuitable as 
such, is prima facie strange. 
3) In the event that the identity is judged to obtain, nevertheless the 
asymmetry between the two remains. We will address these points in order. 
 
1. Does the non-obtaining of the identity vitiate the conception of 
identity at issue? In other words, does its non-obtaining entail the 
non-being of the identity at issue? 
 
No. For the simple reason that the identity is not, even in the Ideas, 
articulated in extensional form (X = Y), but rather across the entirety of the 
claim, to what both mind and nature should be. If nature makes mind 
intuitable, this is in the sense, in other words, that mind’s following from 
                                                 
35 SW I/7, 342. 
36 System der Weltalter, ed. Siegbert Peetz, second edition (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1998), 
147. 
37 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (hereafter, Ideas), SW I/2, 56; trans. E.E. Harris and P. 
Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 42. 
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nature’s production of it will be confirmed in intuition. Yet the identity is 
precisely not intuitable in the sense that observing it in another or in oneself 
would reveal that what I think when I think what I am thinking is not the I 
that thinks it but rather the thinking from which this I issues. The sensible 
intuition of the identity is “of” nature not merely as mind, but as intuition 
insofar as neither does intuition belong to the subject position alone. If it did, 
intuition would be insuperably mine but therefore of nothing at all, or of only 
and always my intuitions. What these local convulsions in the phase space of 
intuition might be if they are not of something—whatever this something is— 
is incomprehensible. They must therefore be of something, and to the extent 
that they are, it is completely irrelevant whether we say what they are of 
comes from one source or another. The thought “I am having an intuition of 
nature” remains true, in other words, whether or not the nature in question is 
nature in itself or nature insofar as it is presented by and for intuition. In other 
words, if Kant is right about nature as the totality of phenomena, there is no 
room left over for nature to be anything else, which is what point (3) in fact 
means: mind made visible is precisely nature’s operation insofar as this is 
realised in intuition. Of course, neither then is intuited mind simultaneously 
the intuiting owing to the insuperable asymmetry between the two acts. Thus, 
intelligence “appears to itself as limited through productive intuition,”38 
which productive intuition it does not, insofar as it is this producing, intuit. 
 Thus (4) there remains the asymmetry. Schelling in fact claims that 
not all nature is visible or manifest in intuition.
39
 This applies 
paradigmatically to mind for the following reason. If nature should be mind 
made visible, what this demands is that the means whereby mind comes to be 
intuitable as nature should themselves be intuited in the nature that so intuits. 
Because these means do not become so intuitable, however, we learn that 
intuition does not intuit precisely the coming into being of intuition or the 
appearance of appearance, just as the emergence of the universe is not a part, 
but rather the limit, of intuition (even if the emergence of the universe itself 
was intuited in that universe). There is in both cases an irresolvably 
inaccessible overhang. This surd—nature before mind precisely self-intuits to 
the extent that in this intuition the nature that it continues to be in intuition 
does not reduce the before to the after. 
 In what sense, then, is visible nature/invisible mind an identity claim 
at all? The conclusion that identity is not a Rorschach fold around a midpoint 
follows from the maintained asymmetry evident in the form of the claim. 
Accordingly, the claim does not flatten the two into one but maintains both, 
mutually irreducible operations simultaneously. But it also follows from this 
that at no point is there a departure from the register of the limited 
intuitability of nature’s involving or evolving of mind. It is precisely in the 
production of mind that nature is what it is insofar as it is a nature in which 
                                                 
38 SW I/3, 525; System, 149. As Schelling graphically puts it elsewhere in that same work, 
“Self-consciousness is the lamp of the whole system of knowledge, but casts its light ahead 
only, not behind” (SW I/3, 347; System, 18). 
39 Hence his claim, in the Ideas, that “a universe exists; this proposition is the limit of 
experience itself. Or rather, that a universe exists is only an idea” (SW I/2, 24; Ideas, 18). He 
adds the contextualizing point in the System: “That a universe . . . is at all, is necessary if the I 
as such is originally restricted” (SW I/3, 481; System, 115). 
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mindedness is occurrent, but precisely here also that the incompleteness of 
the program entails a local convulsion in it that shows features precisely 
insofar as intuition is not qua intuition mistaken about what is intuited. 
 Nor, however, is any concession made as to a local source of 
intuition or psychogenesis, just as we find in the claim, almost 30 years later, 
that “What thinks in me is what is outside me.” 
If we take this claim to parse the Ideas’ identity proposition, the 
theory of space from the Exhibition emerges: according to the claim as to the 
external source of thinking, it is not an I that thinks nor to which thinking 
appears. The space that would be occupied by such a subject shrinks, in this 
claim as in the above, to near zero. Nevertheless, it is not quite zero, as the 
minimal spatial, external division between inside and out overlaps but does 
not meet. It would be in the complete extensional coincidence of the 
overlapping that a subject position would be expelled from the thinking. 
Here, however, no such coincidence arises except insofar as the claim 
stipulates that thinking occurs in one space that folds to articulate the specific 
difference that makes the subject space non-isomorphic with that of thinking. 
This is no zero point (thinking, after all, is occurrent) but rather a line 
following precisely the manner in which “when I think what exists,” what 
exists articulates the thinking in me precisely as the line it draws through the 
line by which “In me” and “outside me” are articulated. Yet the thinking that 
makes space precisely cannot be thought as the closing of that space; my 
thought cannot close the loop by which inside and out are articulated by what 
is outside me because it is what is outside me that is the agent of this. If it is 
objected that this “outside me” is not necessarily nature because nothing has 
been stipulated regarding what this outside is, I reply that it is necessarily not 
not-nature, precisely because, as Schelling argues at length against Kant in 
the Exhibition of the Natural Process, space simply is the form of externality, 
and externality articulates my inside insofar as the latter is in the former. 
Hence Châtelet’s important claim that “Schelling perhaps saw it most clearly: 
he knew that thought was not in every case encapsulated in a brain; that it 
could be everywhere … outside.40  Schelling’s theory of space, that is, is not 
simply what thought extains, but rather a theory of the complex environments 
of thoughts, which environments are, firstly, irreducible to thought (even 
when environments are conceived), and secondly therefore, insuperable by it. 
Thus the outside in which thought occurs is precisely what it is that erupts in 
the thinking that, leaving the outside outside itself, is not only situated in, but 
also articulated by it. 
 What then is the identity common to both claims (“What am I 
thinking?” and “What thinks in me?”)? It is the identity of the operation by 
which what is articulates what is thought (it is precisely as operation that 
identity is thought in the Freiheitsschrift). This is, I claim, one of the 
functions of the Exhibition of the Natural Process: the thereness or 
positioning that is the function of the natural process, which occurs 
specifically when it is there, when it, the Naturprozess, exists, and when it is 
                                                 
40 Châtelet, Gilles, Les enjeux du mobile. Mathématique, physique, philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 
1993), 39. 
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exhibited. The position exhibited in the exhibition attests to the indifference 
of locus with respect to thought and nature. 
 Of course, the identity formulation of the 1801 Darstellung meines 
Systems makes it clear that identity is what is insofar as it is. This univocity is 
differentially articulated by existence, such that each existent introduces a 
tension from the zero difference midpoint from which it stands out or ek-
sists. The 1844 Exhibition complicates but does not destroy this model 
insofar as being is a moment in the content or process of the thought of what 
exists, that moment, namely, that Schelling calls the “subject of existence.” 
As such, this is similarly void of content (it has no object in it) and precedes 
judgment. When Being is therefore being thought—always as desert, says 
Schelling
41—it becomes an object not to itself but in itself, an object that is as 
subjectless as the subject is objectless. To the endless desert surface is added 
an infinite abyss,
42
 a conjunction of the groundless depths of non-being and 
superficially infinite can-being. This copulation of being and ungrounding is 
not however barren, it is precisely the pressure of the attraction between them 
from which issues the “efflorescence of being”, the locus of the existent that 
is not yet the existent as such. 
 Copulative reproduction is central also to the Freiheitsschrift’s 
account of identity: the relation of ground and consequent evident in the 
propositions A is A or the body is blue, is such a relation just when a 
consequent is a consequent. That is, without a genuine consequent, without 
something independent issuing from that on which it is dependent, no 
consequence has in fact occurred. A child, that is, is a child precisely to the 
extent that it is not its parent, and while to be that child ‘it’ depends on 
parents, this dependence is insufficient to determine the child as other than 
consequent, both in the sense of ‘following’ and ‘issuing’ from. The copula in 
the identity claim, therefore, is not the fold around which the terms’ 
extensions are coincident, but the operation by which identity—being—is 
differentially distributed. 
 So if identity, which Schelling called, in the Philosophie der 
Offenbarung, “the discovery of my youth,”43 is consistently interrogated 
throughout the work, its basic formula consists not in the translation of all 
objects one into the other, such that, in the end, identity returns existence to 
the infinite desert of Being—that is, it is not an extensional account—but 
rather an extensity account in the following sense: identity is the ongoing 
operation of differentiation, a creation of consequents that, insofar as it is 
copulative, has surface and depth but no final ground. This is the law of 
insuperable environment. 
 If then we turn to the later philosophy, as here considered in the 
Exhibition, and ask in what form identity may, as it were, survive, my claim 
is that it survives in the copulative process, in the quantitative mixture of 
                                                 
41 SW I/10, 312. 
42 SW I/10, 304. 
43 Schelling, Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/2, ed. M. Frank (Third edition. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1993), 95. The discovery is not identity per se, but the identity system, as Schelling 
confirms in History: “Identity system” indicates “that neither a one-sided real nor a one-sided 
ideal” but rather “one ultimate subject was being thought in … the real and the ideal” (SW 
I/10, 107; History, 120). 
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Being and not-Being familiar from Plato’s Sophist. This process is logically 
the making of judgments: “S is p”, where the copula does not reward its 
terms either with Being or identity, but rather makes them moments in a 
process. Ontologically, it is the intimacy of Being and not-Being, of the 
subject of being and the object it becomes towards itself. If, however, we ask 
this question in terms of existence, we are thrown back to two questions: 
 
1) Does Schelling’s claim that the “moments” of the Idea are as 
such “outside the idea”44 amount to the claim that these moments 
are “existents”? In other words, does the positivity of the positive 
philosophy reside in the externality of these moments to the 
negative, or is this outside itself reducibly negative?  
2) Is the Exhibition itself the operation of the nature-process or is it 
about that process? In other words, how is the externality of the 
moments of the idea related to the process of nature, on the one 
hand, and thought, on the other? What, that is, operates the 
Darstellung as a process internal and external to the Idea, while 
the Idea remains external to the external; or how strained is 
identity here? 
 
If the negative philosophy is taken to entail the complete environing, the 
containment or “Begriffensein”45 of the conceived in the conceiving (without 
which there would be no conceiving) of its items in thought alone—as the 
containing of content as conceived—and this containment is thought, rather 
than as impinged upon by an exteriority, incapable of achieving it, then 
although the process <-A+A ±A> can never arrive at an existent outside it, it 
is entirely consonant with the abrupt, anti-deflationary and asymmetrical 
identity claims Schelling makes, that nevertheless an existent occurs in this 
containment, since in order that it be a containing, there must exist something 
that it contains. In other words, the thought of the existent is itself an existent, 
even if it is not the existent that thought has as its attractor. 
 If this is taken to mean that therefore only intelligence, thought, call 
it what you will, ek-sists in the negative philosophy, the following problems 
arise: 
 
1) How does the maximal containment thesis get round the problem of 
the environment of intelligence stipulated in the asymmetry of both 
identity accounts above? The thinkability, after all, of the desert of 
being is itself consequent upon the Being that cannot be pre-thought 
in that thinking as precisely what is antecedent to that thinking and 
therefore environs it. “It is not because there is thinking that there is 
Being, but because there is Being that there is thinking,” as the 
Grounding of Positive Philosophy puts it.
46
 
2) By what is thinking environed? Provided only that it does so against 
the subject of existence and its “self-objectivisation” (-A+A), or from 
                                                 
44 SW I/10, 306. 
45 Schelling’s phrase “Begriffenseyn in einem andern” (SW I/7: 346) concisely names 
environmental insuperability. 
46 SW II/1, 161n; Grounding 203n.  
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the collision of the infinite surface with infinite depths, then this is 
the environment from which the thinking stands out and of which the 
thinking is consequent. Even though the subject of existence itself 
does not exist, the thought “the subject of existence” does, and this 
thought is environed. 
3) That the moments of the Idea are outside the Idea, taken alongside 
the critique of Kant’s concept of space as being reducibly 
subjective,
47
 suggests that externality is necessary and sufficient to 
establish space not merely as thought, or as a subjective condition of 
experience: “With space, then, something completely extra-
conceptual is posited, and it is nothing other than form i.e., the 
universal and infinite possibility of extra-conceptual Being.”48 
 
 While there can be no difference in kind between the existence 
entailed for the thinking that arises in the negative and that entailed for 
externality as such, there is here a contrast between the form and possibility 
of Being that is now extra-conceptual according to Schelling, and the 
moments of the Idea that are outside the Idea, the powers immediately, i.e., 
“by nature,” environing and exhibiting it. Minimally, it may be said that the 
externality at issue is externality, and that therefore we may discount the 
hypothesis that only thought ek-sists in or for the negative philosophy. 
 So if thought, dimensionalising the collision of surface and depth in 
not-being, exists, maximal containment is necessarily limited. Thought has 
Being as its content just when it exits existents, when thought thinks the 
unconditioned or absolute as the abyss or is ungrounded. Thought does not 
get outside the Idea, but nor does it arise only in it. To think “what am I 
thinking when I think what exists?” requires a descendental or “regressive” 
strategy with respect to the existents that environ it and on which the subject 
of existence is consequent. Thus the beginning made in thought is already 
consequent upon the descent whose trajectory opens beneath the desert and 
reduces the surface dimension to a point. The exhaustion of negation is 
dependent upon the negation from which it starts. In this sense, “what am I 
thinking when I think what exists” is a negative identity hypothesis and an 
attempt absolutely to extract thought from its environment, or to realize the 
idea. That nothing can be extensionally identified with being we know from 
the identity theses set out above, and from those set out in the 1801 System. 
Since thinking and Being fall into precisely this class of extensions, the 
negative philosophy’s experiment therefore demonstrates the necessary 
failure of spontaneous human cognition as consequent upon the incomplete 
extainment of thought and environment. My thesis is that the failure of the 
negative cannot but culminate in the presentation of the process of nature, but 
also that the lessons of the negative philosophy are requisite if this 
presentation is to be achieved. 
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Third Universio: The Nature of Nature 
 
To illustrate this, I will look at two problems—that of the nature of nature 
and, finally, that of matter. 
Just as in the Universal Deduction of the Dynamic Process of 1800 
Schelling argued that not only must the concept of matter be constructed, but 
so too matter itself,
49
 and therefore that matter is not first given either as 
concept or as such, so in the Exhibition the problem of matter is treated not 
primitively, but consequently: “Matter cannot be posited as original … but 
only as already consequent upon a becoming.”50 Thus matter is not but 
becomes by way of the subjugation of the start to the process, because 
whatever is consequent is consequent upon something to which it relates as 
its ground or material. The beginnings of matter, Schelling argues, consist in 
the uni-versio, the inversion of the existent or the “one that exists” to 
“become matter for the higher.”51 Motion (rotation), dimension (surface and 
depth, raising and subordination) and operation (antecedence and 
consequence) are thus established in a non-authochthonous, that is, a 
consequent universe (“valid only in the negative” 52), the universe for such 
operations as existence supplies the matter on which to perform them. 
 Although Schelling is clear that the condition under which the One 
inverts or partially rotates is that it be thought negatively, since we know that 
thought, regardless of its content, exists, the process it exhibits is externality 
insofar as matter is in space. Thus the line introduced into not-being is not a 
posit, but the consequent of the non-being of the surface as the point of its 
conjunction with depth, just as matter is consequent on both what has not yet 
become it and upon the operations oriented through its position. 
 Although therefore the Exhibition presents matter as “self-
actualising,”53 either its consequent nature makes this false, in which case it 
does not self-actualise but is merely and permanently matter (so that Being 
and matter have identical extensions); or, if its consequent nature is true, it is 
precisely not self-actualising insofar as it is consequent upon another that is, 
to that extent, not matter. If matter therefore is process-regional, a turning 
point in the production of existents, this is because the process conjoins 
matter and thought, not as of equal extension, but as of varying and 
asymmetrical extent without which we have desert or no matter at all. The 
concept ‘matter’ is therefore a discriminatory one, preventing saturation of all 
states (Being is matter) just as it prevents the emptying of all but one (matter 
is a body). As such, it demonstrates that the uni-versum hypothesis proper to 
the negative philosophy, is not a universe but is in one on which it is 
consequent. Nor is this the all-the-way-down emboîtement of 
preformationism, since the universe the universe is in is, by definition, not 
extensionally identical with the universe in it. As a result of this, however, the 
thinking that exists in consequence of the collision of infinite Being and 
infinite not-being, of deserted surface and groundless depths, exists not in but 
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from the negative, and limns precisely the space into which all the 
dimensions and motions of the universio, spill. Otherwise, thinking takes 
place in another environment than does what thinks, on the one hand, and 
what is thought, on the other.  
Negative philosophy seeks to constitute its autochthony, as the self-
grounding universe, from the thought of the subject of existence that does not 
itself exist. But this thought being consequent by nature entails that the 
universe so constructed is inverted with respect to the antecedence it cannot 
think without thinking it consequently. The conditions, therefore, for the self-
construction of the existent are therefore the presupposition of the extensional 
identity of thought and being, and the inversion thereby of the extending of 
identity that existence is, completed by the symmetrical cognition of the 
“nature of nature.” In nature thinking—“what thinks in me is what is outside 
me”—identity precisely differentiates or evolves by virtue of the asymmetry 
of environment with respect to consequent. In negative thinking, by contrast 
—“what am I thinking when I think what exists”—the failure of internal 
closure—the fact that I cannot think what exists, but only the existence of 
what exists—thereby demonstrated reveals, in the externality or consequence 
of the thought on what is thought, regardless of what this might be, that 
nature does not issue from it without having been antecedent to it. The 
exhibition of the nature-process is therefore an ethics of nature to the extent 
that it reveals the negative philosophy’s inversion of the relation of 
consequent to ground, the self-grounding, autochthonous universio, is 
conceptually evil precisely to the extent that its consequents—the concepts 
issuing from it—are subordinated to self-containment. 
Accordingly, then, as the identity thesis is tested to the limit in the 
universio that cannot contain all its consequents just as it cannot be its own 
antecedent, the moments of the process of its environment are exhibited. The 
question therefore is not whether this is a nature merely of, in or from 
thought, but rather of the universe in which thought takes place, on the one 
hand, and the motions created by it, on the other. Concepts do not only take 
place, as Gilles Châtelet says, in brains, but are “outside … everywhere.”54 
This does not mean that thoughts are not dependent upon brains or some 
other functionally equivalent apparatus; nor that these are themselves 
somehow independent of 14 billion years of evolution; quite the contrary: it 
rather means that thinking is done in a nature whose nature is not boxed in, 
but boxed out. Exhibition, therefore, is the exhibition of precisely what is 
thought when what is doing the thinking is outside, everywhere.  
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